This article presents a theorization of craft as an analytic concept that can be applied in studies of the work of professionals, including both judges and lawyers. Building on sociological work that distinguishes craft from art, I describe a set of elements that can be used to analyze the work and working situation of lawyers, judges, and other professionals: utility, consistency, clientele, skills and techniques, problem solving, and aesthetic. I posit that these elements can be organized along two dimensions, one that distinguishes between elements that are internal to the craft community and those that are external, and a second dimension that distinguishes elements that deal with production, functionality, and evaluation. The article concludes with suggestions as to how this framework might be applied to the analysis of the work of judges.
INTRODUCTION
T HE WORK of judges is highly varied. It can involve criminal matters, family matters, private disputes of various types, and challenges to governmental decisions. Judges find themselves called upon to make decisions about the law, to determine facts, to assess the believability of witnesses, to instruct juries (and, in England, to 'sum up' cases for juries), to manage courtrooms, to impose criminal sanctions, and to determine damages. Judges perform their work in majestic courthouses, decrepit buildings, small hearing rooms, and their offices or chambers. Some judges spend most of their time working in a single building, while others travel from place to place to handle cases in a variety of communities. Advocates appearing before judges include accomplished specialists, struggling beginners, and inarticulate self-represented litigants. Throughout all of the variations, we expect judges to act with intelligence, dignity, neutrality, respect, compassion, and efficiency.
The challenges facing judges are immense, and judges are remarkably successful in responding to and meeting those challenges. The other articles in this symposium apply the rubric of 'judgecraft' to capture various elements of how judges achieve this success. The contributions consider how the physical design of courtrooms impacts the work of judges, how judges deal with decision making in highly repetitive and routine cases, and how judges handle the challenge presented by self-represented litigants who largely do not understand the technical and practical needs of adjudicatory processes. Labeling the theme that unites these articles 'judgecraft' raises the possibility of something more than a handy turn of phrase referring to how members of an occupation do their work. Can we theorize the concept of 'craft', or alternatively 'craftwork', and does such a theorization suggest questions for empirical study of judges and their work?
The first question we must ask is, what is 'craft'? We regularly speak of craft in a wide variety of contexts. My search of the University of Wisconsin library catalog for books with titles starting with the phrase, 'The Craft of . . .' yielded 142 entries, including some duplicates reflecting books that went through multiple editions. The titles of the books ranged from The Craft of Argument to The Craft of Wood Carving. The item most relevant to judgecraft is The Craft of Justice (Flemming et al., 1992) . While this book, which is a study of key actors -judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers -in the criminal justice systems, does not conceptualize craft, it does offer a definition: 'Craft is practical knowledge of how others perform their work and of the relationships involved in this work. It combines personal experiences with the lessons learned by others so that legal practitioners can organize their work and manage their relations ' (p. 195) . Unfortunately, this only suggests that craft is how someone does his or her job, and how doing that job involves the use of practical knowledge and prior experience. We need a conceptualization of craft that has some theoretical richness.
TOWARD A CONCEPT OF CRAFT I did my graduate study at the University of North Carolina in the early 1970s. About 60 miles from Chapel Hill there is an area that has been the home of indigenous potters since the 18th century. These were 'production' potteries where basic set pieces would be 'turned' on the wheel and finished with interesting glazes. For most of the pieces produced, the emphasis was on functionality; these were pieces of pottery that were to be used in ordinary daily life.
Starting around 1970 potters not native to the local area began to locate in this region of North Carolina. Many of these young potters had trained in university-based art departments. For these potters, there was a greater emphasis on decoration, and they saw their work less as producing utilitarian objects to be used day-to-day, and more as creating pieces that would be displayed as decoration or art. What is it that distinguishes the craftsperson from the artist, and what does that begin to tell us about 'craft' as a concept?
Howard Becker (1978) provides a useful discussion of the distinction between art and craft. Central to Becker's discussion is the transition between art and craft, and how that transition informs the conceptual distinction between the two. Becker starts with what he calls the 'folk' definition of a craft: '[A] body of knowledge and skill which can be used to produce useful objects: dishes one can eat from, chairs one can sit in, cloth that makes serviceable clothing, plumbing that works, electrical wiring that carries current ' (p. 864) . Importantly, Becker does not limit the notion of craft to the production of objects: 'From a slightly different point of view, [craft] consists of the ability to perform in a useful way: to play music that can be danced to; serve a meal to guests efficiently; arrest a criminal with a minimum fuss; clean a house to the satisfaction of those who live in it' (p. 864). Becker identifies two key elements in this definition: the fact that knowledge and skill are used to produce a product or service that is useful and the fact that the work is done for or on behalf of someone else to fulfill that person's need for a useful object or service.
However, more is needed to label something a craft. According to Becker (1978) , in addition to function and the end user, craftsmen accept a[n] . . . aesthetic standard: virtuoso skill. Most crafts are quite difficult, with many years required to master the physical skills and mental disciplines of a first-class practitioner. One who has mastered the skills -an expert -has great control over the craft's materials, can do anything with them, can work with speed and agility, can do with ease things that ordinary, less expert craftsmen find difficult or impossible . . . The specific object of virtuosity varies from field to field, but it always involves an extraordinary control of materials and techniques. Sometimes virtuosity also includes mastering a wide variety of techniques, being able not only to do things better than most others but also to do more things. Virtuoso craftsmen take pride in their skill and are honored for it in the craft and sometimes by outsiders. (p. 865) The aesthetic inherent in craftwork provides an important standard by which one craftsperson can assess the work of another. Importantly, while the layperson may be able to recognize differences in quality among producers, it often takes a practising craftsperson to be able to identify what it is that distinguishes a first-rate job/product from an adequate or typical job/product. Becker (1978) applies the nation of 'beauty' as a criterion for assessing craft activities, and goes on to distinguish between 'ordinary' craftspersons and the 'artist' craftsperson. The key distinction between the two groups is the importance of the aesthetic element, the concern about 'beauty'. The ordinary craftsperson wants to see that a job is well done, and the desired function is achieved; however, the ordinary craftsperson may not be concerned about whether the result is beautiful, or as a possible alternative concept, 'elegant' (p. 866). The artist-craftsperson, in Becker's analysis, is still concerned about functionality and usefulness, but seeks to achieve a standard that goes beyond achieving those goals. In Becker's analysis, the artist-craftsperson produces work that has 'some claim to be considered "art" by the custodians of conventional art -collectors, curators, and gallery owners ' (p. 866) . The nexus between the artist-craftsperson and the end user is weaker in Becker's analysis, and the artist-craftsperson looks beyond the end user (and other craftspersons) for recognition of his/her work.
However, one can imagine a somewhat milder distinction among craftspersons which moves beyond the end-user (or customer/client) but not all the way to the 'custodians of conventional art'. Imagine a tiler installing a new ceramic floor in your kitchen. The ordinary craftsperson will want to be sure that the job is done right, that there is the proper underlayment, that the tiles are lined up in precise lines, that the grouting is evenly colored and applied properly, that any cut tiles will look right, that the proper capping tiles are used, and so on. The resulting floor will be functional and attractive. The artist-craftsperson will go at least one step further, and want the result to be more than functional and attractive. The artist-craftsperson will seek out touches that will make the resulting floor beautiful or elegant. This may involve suggesting something more than a simple square tile, perhaps a pattern of tile of some sort or including some distinctive tiles intermixed to produce a more elegant result. The floor will still be intended as something to be walked on and used in everyday life, but the discerning observer will notice that there is something special here, something more than just a good solid floor. That is, there is an audience beyond the customer/client; someone coming into my kitchen and seeing this tile work will more likely take note and comment on its beauty or elegance.
In Becker's (1978) analysis, the larger distinction comes when the craft becomes art (or, in his words, 'art invades craft' (p. 867)). Key here is that artists turn to the medium of the craftsperson to produce artistic expression, although one can imagine the craftsperson moving themselves into the art world. The goal is now the expression of the creator, whether we label the creator artist or craftsperson. Usefulness or functionality is secondary, if it is important at all. While a piece of work may be created as a 'commission', choice lies primarily in the hands of the creator rather than working to specification (beyond perhaps the most general statement of where the piece of work will be placed or what it might be placed with). The audience is the world of art, not the world of use. Becker gives the example of a group of artists gaining control of a ceramics department in an art school and insisting that no 'high-fire' pottery be made in the department; high firing is necessary to insure that clay objects be useful for household purposes (holding water, withstanding daily use, etc.).
Interestingly, along with the devaluation of utility, the artist working in what is traditionally viewed as a craft may devalue the 'old craft standards of skill ' (p. 867) . Work that a craftsperson might see as 'sloppy' becomes elevated to art. Where the craftsperson values the ability to produce objects repeatedly, the artist focuses on the uniqueness of each object; the craft skill to turn on the potter's wheel a set of matching bowls as part of a dinner 324
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service is not important to the artist because the artist has no interest in producing something as functional as a dinner service. For the artist, it is better that no two objects be alike because art generally does not involve duplication but creation.
DIMENSIONS OF CRAFTWORK
From this discussion, we can distill the central elements of a usable concept of 'craft', or perhaps better, 'craftwork'. By 'craftwork' I mean the nature of the work that is done within the context of a craft.
CRAFTWORK PRODUCES SOMETHING THAT HAS UTILITY
As discussed earlier, the product of craftwork is something that others value for its utility. The traditional craftsperson produced something tangible such as a piece of clothing or a door. However, we do not need to limit craftwork to the production of objects; it can also include the production of a service ranging from serving a meal to performing a complex medical procedure or summing up a case for a jury.
CRAFTWORK HAS AN IDENTIFIABLE CUSTOMER OR CLIENTELE
The work is done on behalf of the customer or clientele. Craftwork is typically done to two levels of specification. One level is set by the customer or client and the other level is set by the norms of the craft. The client may recognize the absence of some aspects of the internal norms but will probably miss the more subtle aspects of it.
CRAFTWORK INVOLVES PRODUCING A CONSISTENT PRODUCT
As noted previously, craftwork involves producing objects repeatedly in contrast to the work of an artist who focuses on the uniqueness of each object. Thus, the product of craftwork has the characteristic of consistency. That consistency could range from the ability to fashion a set of matching dinnerware on a potter's wheel to producing a delectable chocolate soufflé in a restaurant kitchen.
CRAFTWORK INVOLVES AN INTERNAL AESTHETIC
While laypersons can draw broad distinctions among the products of craftsperson, the core aesthetic of the craft is internal to the craft community. There
are important yet subtle distinctions that few outside the community can see or recognize. The members of the craft community appreciate what to the layperson would be 'little things' that do not affect the functionality of the product or service provided by the craftsperson. Thus, if one is looking at a piece of homemade clothing and comparing it to a piece of handmade clothing produced by a skilled seamstress or tailor, the layperson is not likely to notice how precise the stitching is or whether a particular technique had been used in part of the construction of the garment. The trained tailor or seamstress, on the other hand, will notice these things and recognize the difference between a garment made by a 'pro' and one made a layperson. One can also see this idea of internal aesthetic in areas where the product is 'intangible'. Take the following statement by a professional musician I know:
Playing music for a living, it is easy to take for granted what we do. We find ourselves watching the clock on gigs, and complaining on our breaks of being underpaid and overworked. In private, we joke about the clueless audience members who come up to the stage and rave about our performance -'You guys are the best band I've ever heard!'; 'How do you get that sound?!' or, 'Y'all bad!' We laugh at them because we obsess over the quality of our individual performance, and thus we only think about how much better we could have played.
Thus, while the consumer of a craftsperson's work makes judgments about the quality of that work, for the craftsperson the more important assessment comes from norms developed within the community of craftspeople. What may seem excellent to the consumer may not be seen in such a light by the craftsperson or other members of the craft community.
Clearly, craftspersons regularly go well beyond what is necessary to accomplish a given task. Frequently this may involve aspects that come to resemble a ritual in that it is done not because it is a necessary part of the work but because it serves an internalized function that the craftsperson finds satisfying or useful. An example for a musician may be tuning and retuning an instrument well beyond anything anyone would recognize as being out of tune. Hughes (1971: 322) observes that the amount of ritual varies among occupations, with it being strongly developed in those where there 'are great unavoidable risks' such as medicine. However, as the musician example above illustrates, ritual is not limited to situations of risk. There is of course the question of where ritual ends and superstition begins.
CRAFTWORK INVOLVES AN IDENTIFIABLE SET OF SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES
Each area of craftwork is defined by a set of skills and techniques. Some of this involves 'knowledge' which can be systematized and conveyed through written or verbal instruction. For example, for a tailor or seamstress, there are a variety of types of stitches that can be used, some appropriate in limited situations and others appropriate in large numbers of situations.
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While there may be innate talents or abilities, the true skill of craft is specialized in nature and comes only with time and practice, typically obtained under the tutelage of a person who has previously mastered the craft. The specialized skills required for many areas of craftwork can only be learned through some type of training process. However, even where there is a natural talent, the development of the talent to the level of craft usually involves some form of training. Thus, one would distinguish between the untrained singer who can pick up a tune by ear versus the trained singer who can read the music and quickly grasp the style of a piece; or, the difference between the 'natural' actor versus someone who has had systematic training in performance. The traditional mode is that of apprenticeship: the apprentice cabinet maker, the apprentice potter and so on. However, the training need not involve apprenticeship; it can be in the form of more formal teaching.
The level of skill involved in craftwork is such that a significant amount of what the accomplished craftsperson does cannot readily be described by that craftsperson. The person simply does it and does not think about it. Can the master potter tell the novice what it is that they do to produce a pot with extremely thin walls? Can the master carpenter explain how he knows the precise way to position a door frame for proper alignment? Can the skilled lawyer tell the young associate precisely what she did that wowed the jury in the summation of a case?
Atul Gawande (2002) describes his experience as a surgical resident learning how to place a 'central line' which involves inserting a small catheter through the chest to provide direct nourishment and/or medication. His first couple of times doing this ended in failure, with the task being taken over by a more senior resident. On the third occasion, he successfully carried out the procedure, and then observed, I still have no idea what I did differently that day. But from then on, my lines went in. Practice is funny that way. For days and days, you make out only the fragments of what to do. And then one day you've got the whole thing. Conscious learning becomes unconscious knowledge, and you cannot say precisely how . . . When everything goes perfectly . . . you don't think. You don't concentrate. Every move unfolds effortlessly. You take the needle. You stick the chest. You feel the needle travel -a distinct glide through the fat, a slight catch in the dense muscle, and then the subtle pop through the vein wall -and you're in. At such moments, it is more than easy; it is beautiful. (pp. 21-2) This quote illustrates that at least some aspects of craftwork become 'automatic' in that the craftsperson simply does them without thinking about them. 1 Certainly some aspects remain conscious. In the case of the surgeon, this includes such things as checking that instruments are available, proper sterilization, and so on. However, other aspects are not conscious, because while carrying out the work, the craftsperson does not think explicitly about all the steps; she or he simply does many of them.
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While craftwork is often repetitious, it also regularly involves unanticipated problem solving. Something does not work as expected, or something goes wrong, and the craftsperson has to make adjustments on the fly. For a musician or actor this might involve a missed cue. For a lawyer, it could involve an unexpected answer during questioning of a witness. For a nurse, it could be a failure of a patient to respond as expected to some aspect of treatment. The craftsperson needs to be able to improvise in ways that both serve the ultimate goal and which draw upon the craftsperson's skill and experience. Drawing the line between the very routine and craft can be tricky. A key element here comes in terms of the possibility of having to deviate from the routine. In the factory setting, a worker might encounter a defective part in something he or she is assembling; however, all that is necessary is to discard the defective part and get a replacement. In contrast, in craftwork the deviations from the routine are more challenging even when the emphasis is on routinization. Gawande (2002) describes a medical clinic, Shouldice Hospital in Toronto, which specializes in hernia repair:
In most hospitals [a hernia repair] takes about ninety minutes and might cost upward of four thousand dollars. In anywhere from 10 to 15 percent of cases, the operation eventually fails and the hernia returns . . . At Shouldice, hernia operations often take from thirty to forty-five minutes. Their recurrence rate is an astonishing 1 percent. And the cost of an operation is about half of what it is elsewhere. (pp. 38-41) This clinic has an exceptionally high success rate because the staff do nothing but hernia repairs. Each surgeon repairs between 600 and 800 hernias a year. With this level of experience, the surgeons at the clinic still encounter complications, but very seldom are the complications so novel that significant conscious thought is needed to come up with a work-around.
SUMMARY
This discussion identified a set of six factors that combine to distinguish craftwork from other kinds of activities, either work that falls below 'craft' such as the kind of production that occurs in a factory setting where workers do a very narrow range of repetitive tasks, or that which achieves the status of 'art'. The six factors can be grouped into two dimensions, those that are external to the craftsperson -those that focus on the product and/or the client -and those that are internal to the craftsperson -those that focus on the producer. The former include utility, clientele, and consistency, while the latter include aesthetics, skills and techniques, and problem solving. We can further organize the six factors to produce a two-dimensional table as shown in Table 1 . The distinction between craft and non-craft production turns 328
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primarily on the three internal factors while the distinction between craft and art turns primarily on the external dimension.
CRAFTWORK IN PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONS
Central to the aforementioned analysis is the idea that craft is linked to the nature of work that is performed. There are a number of sociological perspectives on professions, ranging from the functionalist work of Talcott Parsons (1954) to the relational work of Elliot Freidson (1986 Freidson ( , 2001 , Terence Johnson (1972) , and Andrew Abbott (1988) , to the economic analysis of Magali Larson (1977) and the relatively recent work linking professions and gender (Wirtz, 1992) . Most of these perspectives focus on the relationship of the professional to society and/or to the professional's clientele. Despite the recognition that the working world in which professionals go about their work has changed and is continuing to change, 2 there is surprisingly little research focused on the actual work of the professional, particularly since a profession is an occupation, and in that regard, 'consists of a bundle of several tasks . . . [not all of which] require the same degree of skill . . . [and not all of which] have the same prestige' (Hughes, 1971: 313) .
THE SURGEON AS CRAFTSPERSON
Consider the following description of one of the surgeons at Shouldice Hospital as the surgeon did a hernia repair:
Though we chatted during the entire operation, Dr. Sang performed each step without pause, almost absently, with the assistant knowing precisely which tissues to retract, and the nurse handling over exactly the right instruments; instructions were completely unnecessary . drapes, the patient swung his legs over the edge of the table, stood up, and walked out of the room. The procedure had taken just half an hour. (Gawande, 2002: 39-40) From this account it should not be surprising that Gawande refers to Shouldice Hospital as the 'hernia factory'. There is a striking similarity to the 'production' handcraft pottery which can turn out one piece after another that are to the same design, or to Amish furniture makers who produce the same table, by hand, again and again and again.
'PROFESSIONALISM'
One hears the term 'professionalism' used in the context of a wide range of occupations, both those that we commonly label as 'professions' (medicine, law, teaching, social work, etc.) and those that we do not (cook or waiter in a restaurant, 3 truck driver, plumber, secretary). One can see the terms professional and professionalism as distinguishing amateur from amateurism. The first pair of terms -professional and amateur -distinguishes between someone who engages in an activity for the pleasure of it rather than the money (i.e. a musician who plays simply for the love of music rather than as a means of earning a livelihood). The contrast can also be used in reference to the quality of the work performed. This is the more common usage in reference to the second pair of terms -professionalism and amateurismwith the former denoting a commitment to quality and care, with the latter often used in a derogatory manner to reflect on both the skill and the result produced by the non-professional. Used in this way, the term professionalism is closely linked to craft. Specifically, when we speak of someone completing a task in a 'professional' manner, or when someone speaks about being professional about how she does her work, the reference is to a commitment to standards that are associated with the particular work or task. That is, the word professionalism is used to convey something about how well the worker performs his or her job, not about the position of the occupational group as a whole on a continuum of professionalism. The nature of those standards will typically be similar to the kinds of elements, both external (consistency, utility, and clientele) and internal (skills and techniques, problem solving, and aesthetic), that are associated with craftwork.
'Professional work', as distinct from work carried out in a 'professional manner' or the worker's status as a professional rather than an amateur, has some special features that differentiate it from the work of occupations not 330
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falling within what those sociologists would label as one of the professions. A central distinguishing feature of professional work in this sense is the nature of the knowledge involved. Schon (1983) describes the dominant model of professional knowledge as 'the application of scientific theory and technique to the instrumental problems of practice ' (p. 30) . This suggests that what makes work 'professional' is that it involves using knowledge that is based on 'science'. Schon defines science broadly such that it includes law, reflecting a view that law is based in the same general ideology of 'technical rationality' as is areas such as medicine (pp. 28-30). However, as I have previously argued in my own research on lawyers' work in litigation (Kritzer, 1990 ) and on legal advocacy (Kritzer, 1998) , the work of lawyers and legal advocacy involves expertise and activities that go well beyond the 'formal' knowledge and activities associated with sciencelike training. In the earlier of that work (Kritzer, 1990) , I distinguish between what I have labeled formal legal activities (the kinds of things imparted by formal legal training) and informal legal activities (the kinds of things that are learned by doing litigation and have more of an 'insider' nature). My later work (Kritzer, 1998) refined the dimensions of expertise into: (a) formal training vs. insider knowledge; (b) generalist vs. specialist; (c) substantive vs. process. These kinds of distinctions are useful in beginning to think about the skills and tasks involved in professional work more generally, and how those might be recast into the idea of craftwork. 4 Consider an example from the world of medicine.
Think about the practitioner who sees lots of ill children. Here is someone who has had a lot of formal training and a lot of on-the-job training. The work involves both diagnosing and treating the child and interacting with the parent (most often the mother) who brings the child in to see the physician. Over the years, I have known a number of young physicians who began their practice before they themselves had any children. Without exception, they have told me that their understanding of parental concern and how to deal with the parents (particularly interpreting the parents' reports of their children's condition and symptoms) changed significantly after they had their own children and had experienced being on the parental side of the diagnostic relationship. What this example brings home is that the 'craft of pediatrics' involves both technical skills and interpersonal skills, particularly interpersonal skills involving persons other than the patient. It involves what Bensman and Lilienfeld (1991: xv) have labeled 'habits of mind'.
The interest here, however, is not medicine, it is the world of law and judging. As indicated earlier, my own work focuses on legal practice. Take the following passage from an interview I conducted with a lawyer as part of a study of how lawyers deal with scientific and expert testimony in light of U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the standards courts should apply in deciding whether to admit such testimony (e.g. Daubert v Merrill Dow [1993] ). In the course of the interview the lawyer described how he went about defending a challenge to one of his side's experts:
Having thought about bringing these motions with some regularity over the span of 11 years, and never having brought one, I felt pretty confident that our opponents had acted in one of the many situations that we routinely consider and reject. The federal judge involved has been on the bench quite a while. He's a very good lawyer. He's a good writer. And he's had his turns through the court of appeals, and he has left behind a written legacy. And I was able to, not only argue from the theory of Daubert and [Federal Rules of Evidence] Rule 702, I was able to take what the expert actually had opined, show what the method was that he had applied to the facts of the case, and the conclusions he's reached, and then reach into this judge's rich written, published recordthe case law of the judge -and find similar cases where he had permitted just this kind of testimony . . . There would have been no opportunity to endorse our expert in front of the judge that way had they not filed that motion. The judge rejected it, almost of out of hand, at a pretrial hearing . . . It was our opportunity to take an awkward situation and make our man shine.
Here the lawyer relies upon knowledge about the judge's own prior views, what the lawyer called 'the case law of the judge', to frame his argument about why his expert's testimony should not be limited or excluded. Moreover, he drew upon his experience thinking about when he would or would not challenge an expert from an opposing side. Interestingly, this lawyer had never actually challenged an opposing expert because, as he put it, when the expert really sucks, that's a gift from heaven. And [we] think long and hard before we deprive our client of the opportunity to show a jury how halfbaked the opposing expert is on an important issue in the case by taking it away from the jury . . . It's counter-intuitive: the worse their expert is, could be the better for us.
What the above example shows is a kind of problem solving that demonstrates what I would describe as a high level of craftwork. It shows a kind of subtle expertise about the litigation process that goes well beyond the mechanics of the process. 5 THE CRAFT OF JUDGING Does the theorization of craft, or more specifically craftwork, have any utility for the analysis of 'judgecraft'? Does it serve to identify questions and issues that are significant for understanding the work that judges perform? Let me assess that potential by briefly looking at each of the six dimensions: consistency, utility, clientele, skills and techniques, problem solving, and aesthetic.
CONSISTENCY
Treating 'like cases alike' is a fundamental goal of the legal system. This is the problem of consistency writ large. One of the challenges of judging is to do precisely this: exercise the vast discretion granted judges in a way that achieves 332
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a just consistency. What this means is something more than simply treating 'like case alike' because while two cases may be alike in formal legal ways, they may be very different in ways that are crucial for our understanding of justice. Judges encounter the issue of consistency on a daily basis, whether it be in sentencing criminal defendants (see Tata, this issue), deciding whether to grant a continuance, awarding damages in a civil matter, determining the best interests of the child in a custody dispute, or setting a level of child support.
In some types of cases, consistency can be achieved relatively easily: the routine drunk driving case, the first time drug offender, small-scale shoplifting, etc., where the sentences are more or less standardized. However, once one moves beyond such cases, it may be much more difficult to maintain consistency. Is it possible to measure consistency in judicial actions? Does consistency increase with experience as is true in most areas of craftwork? Can we identify conditions under which consistency is and is not possible? Are there methods of judicial training that increase consistency? To what degree does the judge's ability to achieve consistency depend on the other players? On this latter point, the articles by Cowan and Hitchings and by Moorhead in this issue are suggestive of the role of other actors, the litigant in person in Moorhead's study and the case of representatives with differing levels of experience and skill in the study by Cowan and Hitchings.
UTILITY
It would seem hardly necessary to ask whether judging has utility. Clearly it is a function that is necessary in a system which prides itself on the rule of law. But what is the nature of the utility that judging serves? How does this depend on the nature of cases a judge is dealing with? How much of what the judge does is symbolic rather than being directly useful to individuals or to society as a whole? Is it important to distinguish between the symbolic and the 'real' in terms of the functions that judging serves? The utility of the judge's work can come under challenge. This would seem to be the situation in many of the housing possession cases described by Cowan and Hitchings; in those cases, the real issue -a failure of welfare authorities to get benefits to recipients who should be receiving them -is hidden from view, and the judges have little power to deal with the real issue. How does the judge deal with a situation where he or she is powerless to confront what is the fundamental issue in the case before them?
CLIENTELE
The clientele of judging is complex: it is the parties to the case, the other actors in the legal system (lawyers, police officers, court personnel), and the larger community. Assessing the quality of judging will be done by all of the KRITZER: TOWARD A THEORIZATION OF CRAFT 333 above, at least to the degree that the judging is visible. Moreover, different groups may assess the quality of the judge's work and actions very differently. There is a large and growing literature that considers procedural justice as influencing litigants' assessments of their treatment in court or similar settings (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002) , and arguably much of the assessment involved on the procedural side will deal with how parties feel they have been treated by the judge.
To what degree do judges distinguish among various 'client' groups, and to what degree might this depend on factors such as the type of cases the judge deals with, the nature of selection and retention systems, and the judge's experience prior to going on the bench? There is a long line of research that shows that at least some judges in the USA are sensitive to client/constituency type issues (Vines, 1964; Levin, 1972; Hall and Brace, 1994; Burnside, 1999) , however, this research generally focuses mostly on citizen constituencies rather than the constituencies or 'clients' in the courtroom itself (but see Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 1988 ). An important exception to this is Lawrence Baum's recent book, Judges and Their Audiences (2006). Baum argues that judges, even those who are most secure in positions without ambitions for advancement (e.g. justices of the U.S. Supreme Court) care about how they are perceived by a range of actors, from colleagues, to the broad public, to the historians who may be examining their records in future decades or centuries:
Judges, like other people, get satisfaction from perceiving that other people view them positively . . . I argue that judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Further, I argue, judges' interest in what their audiences think of them has fundamental effects on their behavior as decision makers. Through their choices in cases, judge engage in self-presentation to audiences whose esteem is important to them. (pp. 3-4) Baum goes on to describe the types of influences specific audiences (colleagues, lawyers, the public) may have on judges. One example he points to is Anthony Scalia, noting, 'Clearly, part of [Scalia's] pleasure derives from the knowledge that other people will read what he writes. Indeed, Scalia's style of opinion writing has won him an admiring audience' (p. 41).
SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES
What are the skills and techniques of judging and how are these acquired? This is a subject that has received attention (Cook, 1971; Carp and Wheeler, 1972; Alpert et al., 1979; Wice, 1981; Goldstein, 1985; Wasby, 1989; Abrahamson, 1993; Abrahamson et al., 1993; Partington, 1994; Malleson, 1997; O'Brien, 2004; Davies, 2005) , but much less than it deserves. Most of what has been written on this subject is descriptive rather than analytic. We know that judges do many different things: adjudicate, mediate, manage a docket and 334
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courtroom, and conduct trials and other proceedings. What are the specific skills involved in these activities? How do the skills interact with bodies of knowledge, both formal and informal, and both substantive and procedural? Mack and Anleu (this issue) consider how judges go about handling a highvolume courtroom, and how the choices judges make in this context can impact judicial legitimacy; clearly, as their analysis shows, how judges employ their skills and apply particular techniques is important for how they are perceived by their 'clienteles', a point which is central in the procedural justice literature previously cited. One skill, common to all legal professionals -judges and lawyers alike, is legal reasoning. Presumably, one of the key functions, if not the key function, of legal education is to train future lawyers (and judges) in the skills of legal reasoning. Despite a substantial literature on legal pedagogy, debates over the form and structure of legal training continue in many countries around the world. One can ask the question of how legal reasoning varies across legal systems, and what that means for legal pedagogy. Should training in common law legal reasoning be conducted differently than training in civil law legal reasoning or Islamic law legal reasoning, or is there an underlying common element that should exist across training in all systems? Even within a given broad legal system, does legal reasoning differ in its emphasis such that a system of training that is strong on problem solving is more important in one country and a system that is strong on form and precedent is more important in another? Is the Socratic method better for imparting one style of legal reasoning while a treatise-oriented system works better for another?
A second skill that is particularly important in judging is judgment: the ability to weigh a complex set of factors and come to a reasoned decision. Judgment is a product of training, experience, and innate personal qualities.
The latter parallels what we call 'talent' in the context of art or performance, but just as training and experience allow talent to be realized, training and experience allow the innate elements of judgment to be realized. As Tata (this issue) discusses, professional 'judgment' has come under attack. Increasingly, judges are being required to turn to formalized frameworks, whether they be mandatory sentencing structures or actuarial tools for assessing risk of future offending. One reason judgment is under fire in the judicial arena is that we know surprisingly little about it in any kind of systematic way; we know a lot about decision making in terms of the patterns and the predictors but this is not the same as the skill of judgment I am referring to. As noted earlier, judges have often reflected upon and written about their work, but such writings are at best data for an analysis of judgment. Part of the problem for the researcher may be that in common law systems, judgeships tend to be the cap of a career, and by the time someone becomes a judge, she or he has long experience and there is no way to go back and capture an understanding of how that person's skills of judgment developed over time. This is an issue where focusing on judges in non-common law systems where there is a bureaucratic structure to judicial careers might provide a better avenue of research.
A second problem in thinking about judicial judgment is the complex set of factors that it involves. It involves processing and assessing information, and hence is related to cognitive theory. However, it also involves significant moral elements, which leads in the direction of moral philosophy. Incorporating this latter element into social science analysis presents a challenge. We can certainly ask judges (and others) to talk about how they see the moral element in what they do; we can certainly design experiments that manipulate moral elements and ask subjects to perform roles similar to judges. In the end, however, it may not be clear whether such approaches really get to the issue of how judges develop and apply the moral element in their exercise of judgment.
PROBLEM SOLVING
At one level, problem solving is fundamental to judging. Cases often do not fit into nice, neat boxes that the law envisions. Judges regularly face the task of balancing conflicting laws, an obvious example of problem solving. At other times, the judge must deal with a situation where no law quite fits but a decision has to be made; again, this is essentially an exercise in problem solving. Or, as described by Tata (this issue), judges engaged in what is for the most part routinized criminal sentencing will encounter situations where the routine does not fit. What practices do judges rely upon to deal with situations where the law is conflicting or ambiguous or does not fit, or a criminal defendant presents an out of the ordinary situation? Of course, there is the simple answer that this involves the fundamentals of legal reasoning, or it is the nature of judicial discretion, but such answers fail to do more than label a set of unclear and ambiguous practices. The craftwork perspective calls out for getting behind the label to grasp the nature of actual practices. What are the types of problem-solving skills that judges need? Why are some judges more effective problem solvers than others? Are there systematic ways to equip judges with problem-solving skills?
AESTHETIC
This may be the most challenging element when we think about judging: what are the aesthetic elements? I would include in this an element of creativity: being willing to try to come up with different ways of thinking about a problem. I would include an ability to communicate decisions in a way that both those affected by the decision and those simply interested in it perceive as reflecting serious and deep consideration. That is, the judge needs to be able to convey a sense of caring and concern. This can come about in how the judge writes a decision, announces a decision in court, or conducts court proceedings. Mulcahy's (this issue) study of courtroom design raises the fascinating question of what role the physical setting where judges conduct 336
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proceedings and announce decisions has in judges' abilities to communicate with the others involved in the court proceeding. We are most often concerned in courtroom design with factors such as dignity and majesty, but are there other elements that need to be considered that affect the 'clientele' of the judge in significant ways? One might also include within aesthetic some elements of judgment. Here I am thinking of the ability to see situations in creative ways, and to come up with decisions and solutions that go far beyond the routine.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have sought to theorize the ideas of craft and craftwork. My purpose is to develop 'craft' into something more than a shorthand for how people do their work. My argument is that craft involves a set of elements which, when taken together, can provide a framework for not just describing how professionals do their work, but can yield insights into how they can do their work better. Some of this would involve training, some would involve introspection. To the degree that such analyses lead to prescriptive insights, they would build on the seminal work of Donald Schon.
I do not want to suggest, however, that prescription is my goal. Rather, prescription would be a useful payoff from better analyses of the work of judges and other professionals. I do see the framework I have described as first and foremost serving an analytic function. However, I do not want to suggest that the framework provides a 'complete' way of understanding the work of judges or any other professional. For any profession there are going to be elements, often unique, that cannot be well captured by any single analytic approach. A good example regarding judging is the exercise of judgment. While the craft framework captures many elements of judgment, I doubt that it captures all elements, with the moral aspect being a particularly prominent weakness. Nonetheless, given that the idea of craft is invoked, the failure of my framework, or potentially alternative conceptualizations of craft, to be comprehensive, does not detract from the advantages of being able to think about and apply the concept in a rigorous, systematic way.
Under the rule of law, judges and judging are crucial. Most of the empirical research that has been done on the work of judges has focused either on the constitutional arena or the criminal arena. We need to develop a broader research agenda on judging, one that looks at the very wide terrain of work that judges do day-in and day-out. 'Judgecraft', and the concepts of 'craft' and 'craftwork' more generally, provide a potential framework for thinking about and analyzing that work, particularly from the perspective of the judges themselves. It also provides a potential framework for comparison: in what ways does judgecraft depend on the larger legal and political system in which the judge is embedded? How does the exercise of judgecraft vary as a function of the type of case and the level of routinization? What role does formal legal training play in the exercise of judgecraft, a question that could KRITZER: TOWARD A THEORIZATION OF CRAFT 337
